Mirror-touch synaesthesia: Difficulties inhibiting the other. by Santiesteban, Idalmis et al.
Running Head: Self-Other and Mirror-touch Synaesthesia 
 1 
 
 
 
Mirror-touch Synaesthesia:  
Difficulties Inhibiting the Other 
Idalmis Santiestebana,*, Geoffrey Birdb, c, Oliver Tewd, Maria Cristina Cioffie and 
Michael J Banissy e, c 
 
 
aDepartment of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet 
Street, London, WC1E 7HX, UK 
bMRC Social, Genetic and Developmental Psychiatry Centre, Institute of Psychiatry 
- PO80, King’s College London, De Crespigny Park, London, SE5 8AF, UK 
cInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen 
Square, London, WC1N 3AR, UK 
dDepartment of Psychology, University of Southampton, Highfield, Southamtpton, 
SO17 1BJ, UK 
eDepartment of Psychology Goldsmiths, University of London, New Cross, 
London, SE14 6NW, UK 
 
 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Idalmis 
Santiesteban, Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck, University of 
London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK. Email: i.santiesteban@bbk.ac.uk
  2 
Abstract 
 
Individuals with mirror touch synaesthesia (MTS) experience touch on their own 
body when observing others being touched.  A recent account proposes that such 
rare experiences could be linked to impairment in self-other representations. 
Here we tested participants with MTS on a battery of social cognition tests and 
found that compared to non-synaesthete controls, the MTS group showed 
impairment in imitation-inhibition but not in visual perspective taking or theory 
of mind.  Although all of these socio-cognitive abilities rely on the control of self-
other representations, they differ as to whether the self, or the other, should be 
preferentially represented.  For imitation-inhibition, representations of the other 
should be inhibited and self-representations should be enhanced, whereas the 
opposite is true for visual perspective taking and theory of mind.  These findings 
suggest that MTS is associated with a specific deficit in inhibiting representation 
of other individuals and shed light on the fractionability of processes underlying 
typical social cognition. 
 
Keywords: mirror-touch synaesthesia, synaesthesia, self-other, social cognition, 
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1. Introduction 
If you see someone being slapped, do you literally feel a slap on your face?  For 
some individuals, seeing somebody else being touched triggers a literal tactile sensation 
upon the corresponding part of their own body – this is known as ‘mirror touch 
synaesthesia’ (MTS). Previous research links MTS to increased activity within neural 
regions supporting somatosensory mirroring (e.g. Banissy & Ward, 2007; Blakemore, 
Bristow, Bird, Frith, & Ward, 2005; Holle, Banissy, & Ward, 2013).  However, although 
these studies show correlational evidence, the cause of such hyperactivity is not yet 
known.1 One account posits that impaired self-other representations could contribute to a 
disinhibition of normal somatosensory mirroring mechanisms in individuals with MTS 
(Banissy & Ward, 2013; Fitzgibbon et al. 2012; Ward & Banissy, In Press).  This account 
builds on findings in non-synaesthetic individuals (Serino, Giovagnoli, & Làdavas, 2009) 
which show that observing another person being touched enhances the perception of 
touch on the self, but only when the other is perceived as being similar to the self (and is 
therefore not a clear ‘other’). 
In line with this view, a recent study (Maister, Banissy, & Tsakiris, 2013) found that 
observing touch to others induces changes in mental representations of the self in 
individuals with MTS. Participants with and without MTS were shown morphed images 
consisting of varying proportions of an unfamiliar face and the participant’s own face, and 
required to report the extent to which the morphed stimulus face looked like the self.  In a 
subsequent phase, participants were presented with videos of another person’s face being 
touched while their own face was touched in synchrony.  The synchrony between 
observed and felt touch resulted in participants rating the morphed face as more similar to 
                                                
*  Abbreviations: MTS (mirror-touch synaesthesia), MASC (movie for the assessment of social cognition),  
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the self than prior to observing the touch video.  In MTS, such blurring of self and other 
identity was seen in the absence of felt touch; the images that participants had initially 
rated as containing equal quantities of self and other became more likely to be recognised 
as the self after viewing the other being touched. Thus, merely observing touch to others 
elicits a change in mental representations in MTS, whereby the boundaries between self 
and other become blurred.  
The Maister et al. study attempts to determine the mechanism by which increased 
somatosensory mirroring occurs in MTS (also see Cioffi, Moore, & Banissy, 2014).  While 
the hypothesis of impaired self-other representations is an important first step in this 
regard, at present it is unclear whether individuals with MTS have a global difficulty 
representing self and others, or whether they have a selective impairment in the control of 
self-other representations (Brass et al., 2000; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Spengler et al., 
2010).  The current study was designed to address this question.   
A battery of social cognition measures, all of which require representation of the 
self and / or another, were administered to a group of individuals with MTS and non-
synaesthete controls. The battery included tests of imitation inhibition, visual perspective 
taking and theory of mind. Although all of these socio-cognitive abilities rely on self-other 
representations, they differ in terms of the required control of these representations.  In 
order to inhibit imitation, representation of the other’s action should be inhibited and 
one’s own motor plan enhanced, whereas the opposite is true for visual perspective taking 
(the other’s perspective should be enhanced and one’s own inhibited) and theory of mind 
(the mental states of the other must be represented and one’s own mental states inhibited). 
Poor performance of the MTS group, relative to controls, on all three measures would 
provide evidence of a global impairment in self-other processing in this group.  
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Dissociation in task performance would suggest a selective impairment in either inhibiting 
the other and enhancing the self (worse MTS performance on imitation inhibition) or 
inhibiting the self and enhancing the other (worse MTS performance on visual perspective 
taking and theory of mind).  Finally, a lack of differential performance between MTS and 
controls in all three tasks would suggest that self-other processing is unimpaired in MTS.    
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Participants 
 
Sixteen mirror-touch synaesthetes (10 female, age M = 32, SD = 12.2 years) and 
sixteen non-synaesthetic control participants (12 female, age M = 32.6, SD = 11.2 years) 
participated in this study for a small monetary reward. All mirror-touch synaesthetes were 
confirmed using a visual-tactile congruity paradigm designed to provide evidence for the 
authenticity of the condition (Banissy & Ward, 2007; see Supplementary Material for 
details on recruitment and screening). The groups did not differ in terms of age (F(1,30) <1, 
p = .94), gender (χ2 (1, N = 32= .58, p = .45) or IQ (F(1,30) <1, p = .73). Ethical approval 
was granted by Birkbeck’s Department of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee.  
 
2.2. Procedure 
Participants completed the imitation-inhibition, visual perspective-taking and 
theory of mind tasks (order counterbalanced across participants) prior to the IQ measure 
(Raven’s Progressive Matrices). A detailed description of the social cognition tasks is 
provided in the Supplementary Material, a summary is provided below. 
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2.2.1 Social Cognition Tasks 
In the imitation-inhibition task (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; 
Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2012) participants were required to respond with 
an index or middle finger lifting action to a number cue (1 = index, 2 = middle) that 
appeared between the fingers of an on-screen stimulus hand.  Contiguous with the 
appearance of the number cue, the stimulus hand executed a lifting movement of the 
index or middle finger. Although the observed movements were formally task-irrelevant, 
the relationship between the observed movement and the movement specified by the 
number defined two trial types. On congruent trials, the required finger movement was the 
same as the observed movement (Fig. S1 – left panel); whereas on incongruent trials, the 
required finger movement was different from the observed movement (Fig. S1 – right 
panel). Thus, on incongruent trials, participants were required to inhibit the tendency to 
imitate the stimulus hand (self representations must be enhanced and other representations 
inhibited).  
The perspective-taking task (Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Santiesteban et 
al., 2012), required participants to adopt the viewpoint of a ‘Director’ who gave them 
instructions to move objects on a shelf. Experimental trials involved a conflict between the 
Director’s and the participant’s perspective, and therefore control of self and other 
representations was again necessary for accurate performance. However, in contrast to the 
imitation-inhibition task, accurate performance on this task requires enhancement of the 
other and inhibition of the self perspective. 
Theory of mind ability was measured with the movie for the assessment of social 
cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006).  Participants watched a 15-minute film and were 
asked to make inferences about the mental states of the characters.  The film shows four 
people interacting socially.  The video is paused at various points and participants are 
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required to answer a multiple-choice question about the last scene.  There are two types of 
questions: theory of mind (e.g., “why is Cliff saying this?”) and control questions (e.g., 
“what kind of pasta sauce are the characters preparing?”). Errors on the MASC are of three 
types (complete lack of, insufficient, or excessive/over-interpretative mental state 
reasoning) – See Figure S1 in the Supplementary Material.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Imitation-inhibition task 
Three MTS participants reported a ‘tingling’ sensation or feeling of touch in some of 
the trials. To avoid any additional tactile sensations contributing to performance, these 
three participants were removed from the analysis (their inclusion does not qualitatively 
change the pattern of data). The response times (RT) and accuracy data from the remaining 
participants (MTS N = 13, controls N = 16) were analysed using ANOVA with Group as 
the between-subjects factor (MTS vs. Control) and Trial Type as the within-subject factor 
(Congruent vs. Incongruent).  
 
 
3.1.1. RT  
Figure 1A shows RTs from the imitation-inhibition task.  There was a main effect of 
Trial Type F(1,27) = 130.95; p < .001; η2p= .83; indicating that overall, participants 
responded faster on congruent than on incongruent trials.  The main effect of Group was 
also significant F(1,27) = 6.63; p = .016; η2p= .20.  Overall, the MTS group (M=551 ms, 
S.E.M. = 15) were slower at responding to both types of trials than the Control group 
(M=497.60 ms, S.E.M. = 14).  The Group × Trial Type interaction was also significant, 
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F(1,27) = 6.17; p = .019; η2 p = .19.  Simple effects analysis shows that this interaction was 
driven by the MTS group taking longer when responding to incongruent trials (M=588.66 
ms, S.E.M. = 15.28) than the control group (M=521.89 ms, S.E.M. = 13.77); F(1,27) = 
10.53; p = .003; η2 p = .28; whereas the group comparison for congruent trials was not 
significant (p = .08; η2 p = .10).  A further post hoc analysis compared the performance of 
the groups on incongruent trials while controlling for performance on congruent trials by 
entering the RT on congruent trials as a covariate.  The group difference remained 
significant in this analysis (F(1,26) = 10.23; p = .004; η2 p = .29), indicating that the mirror-
touch synaesthetes found it harder to inhibit the tendency to imitate than did participants 
from the control group.  
3.1.2 Accuracy   
Error data are displayed in Figure 1B.  A response was coded as incorrect when the 
participant’s finger lifting action did not match that specified by the number cue.  Overall, 
participants made more errors in the incongruent (M = 5.8%, S.E.M. = 1) than in the 
congruent trials (M = 1.6%, S.E.M. = .3), F(1,27) = 25.49, p < .001; η2 p = .49 and the MTS 
group made significantly more errors than the control group, F(1,27) = 7.05; p =.013; η2 p 
= .20.  The Group × Trial Type interaction was also significant F(1,27) = 4.89; p =.036; η2 
p = .15.  Simple effects analysis revealed that the MTS participants made significantly more 
errors in the incongruent trials (M=7.9%, S.E.M. = 1.4%) than non-synaesthete control 
participants (M=3.8%, S.E.M. = 1.1%); F(1,27) = 6.56, p = .016, η2 p = .20.  Furthermore, 
this effect remains significant even after controlling for performance on the congruent trials 
using ANCOVA, F(1,26) = 5.85; p =.023; η2 p = .18.  These results confirm the greater 
difficulty experienced by the mirror-touch synaesthetes when required to control self-other 
representations.  
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2 Visual Perspective Taking 
Due to faulty equipment the data from 4 participants in the MTS group were not 
recorded.  The accuracy and RT data from the remaining participants (MTS N = 12; 
controls N = 16) are reported below.  As no significant differences were found between 
the two types of control trials, data were collapsed and analysed as a single control trial.  
An ANOVA was performed with Group as a between-subject factor and Trial Type 
(experimental vs. control) as the within-subjects factor.  
 
3.2.1 RT 
 Participants responded faster to the control trials (M = 2.9s, S.E.M. = .08) than to 
the experimental trials (M = 3.1s, S.E.M. = .12), F(1, 26) = 11.04; p < .003; η2 p = .30.  No 
other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .74). 
 
3.2.2 Accuracy  
 There was a significant main effect of Trial Type F(1,26) = 36.37; p < .001; η2 p = 
.58.  Overall, participants performed better on control trials (M = 96%, S.E.M. = 1.3) than 
on experimental trials (M = 52%, S.E.M. = 7.6).  No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all ps > .70).  Notably, performance on experimental trials by the synaesthetes 
(M = 52%, S.E.M. = 11.5) was the same as controls (M = 52%, S.E.M. = 10), suggesting 
that perspective-taking abilities are not impaired in MTS.  
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3.3 Theory of Mind 
Two separate analyses were performed on the MASC data. The first analysis 
included the accuracy rate for theory of mind and control questions and the second sought 
to investigate if there were group differences in the type of errors participants made.  The 
first analysis revealed that overall, participants’ accuracy was higher for control questions 
(M = 87.7%, S.E.M. = 1.1) than for questions requiring mental state attribution (M = 
80.1%, S.E.M. = 1.5), F(1,30) = 34.06; p < .001; η2p= .53.  Neither the main effect of 
Group, nor the Group × Question Type interaction were significant, (ps > .66).  
The analysis of error data revealed a significant main effect of Error Type, F(2,60) = 
29.37; p < .001; η2p= .50, pairwise comparisons showed that overall, participants made 
more excessive theory of mind errors (M = 4.66, S.E.M. = .37) than errors reflecting either 
insufficient theory of mind (M = 2.84, S.E.M. = .38; p = .003) or lack of theory of mind 
ability (M = 1.44, S.E.M. = .21; p < .001).  No other main effects or interactions were 
significant (all ps > .21).  Since performance on the crucial experimental condition (theory 
of mind questions) was high on both groups, these results imply that mirror-touch 
synaesthetes’ ability to attribute mental states to other individuals remains unimpaired. 
 
3.4 Correlations 
In order to investigate whether the same or different mechanisms contribute to the 
three socio-cognitive tasks, we transformed the raw data of the variables of interest into Z 
scores and performed a correlation analysis. We found a significant negative correlation 
  11 
between accuracy on the MASC and response time in the Director task, rs (25) = - .60, p = 
.001, indicating that those who responded more accurately on the theory of mind task also 
responded faster during the experimental trials of the visual perspective-taking task. This 
correlation remained significant at the group level (controls: rs (14) = - .67, p = .004; MTS: 
rs (9) = - .66, p = .026).  
The MTS and Control groups showed a differential pattern of results with respect to 
correlations with the imitation-inhibition task. For controls, speed on incompatible trials of 
the imitation-inhibition task was correlated with speed on experimental trials of the 
Director task, rs (14) = .697, p = .003, but this was not observed in MTS, rs (9) = - .042, p = 
.92. Thus, in the controls, but not MTS, the ability to enhance the self and inhibit the other 
is correlated with the ability to enhance the other and inhibit the self.  In contrast, the MTS 
group showed a significant negative correlation on accuracy measures of the imitation-
inhibition task and Director task, rs (9) = - .695, p = .038, indicating that MTS participants 
who were better able to enhance the other’s perspective in the Director task showed a 
greater difficulty inhibiting representation of the other in the imitation-inhibition task. The 
equivalent analysis was not significant in the control group, rs (14) = - .011, p  = .97. 
Together, these analyses suggest that regardless of the requirement (i.e. enhancing self and 
inhibiting other or enhancing other and inhibiting self) non-synaesthete individuals have 
no difficulties controlling self-other representations, but individuals with MTS have a 
performance cost when inhibiting representation of the other. 
4. Discussion  
This study sought to investigate if individuals with MTS display atypical self-other 
processing as measured by three different socio-cognitive abilities. The results from the 
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imitation-inhibition task indicate that mirror-touch synaesthetes have difficulties in self-
other processing, as implied by their impaired performance on incongruent trials 
compared to control participants. These data provide further support for the hypothesis of 
faulty self-other monitoring mechanisms in MTS (Banissy & Ward, 2013; Ward & Banissy, 
In Press).  However, no performance differences were observed between the synaesthetes 
and control participants in either visual perspective-taking or theory of mind.  Since self-
other representations also underlie both of these social abilities, these data do not support 
the assumption of a global impairment of self-other representations in MTS.   
Using different socio-cognitive tasks allows specific inferences to be made 
regarding the locus of the self-other impairment in individuals with MTS.  Successful 
performance on the imitation-inhibition task requires participants to inhibit other 
representations and enhance self representations.  In contrast, to perform accurately in the 
visual perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks participants should enhance other 
representations and inhibit self representations.  The fact that individuals with MTS 
perform poorly on the imitation-inhibition test, while their visual perspective taking and 
theory of mind abilities remain intact, suggests that faulty self-other processing in mirror-
touch synaesthetes might be limited to situations in which representations of the other 
should be supressed but not when they should be enhanced.  
The findings from the correlation analysis support the view that mechanisms 
underlying the ability to adopt another person’s visual perspective also contribute to 
understanding the mental states of others. This relationship was found in both MTS and 
typical individuals.  Interestingly, the relationship between imitation inhibition and visual 
perspective taking is not as straightforward. Differences were found between the MTS and 
control groups; although the non-synaesthete participants showed similar interference 
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effects (RT) in both tasks, those with MTS showed differences in accuracy measures of 
these tasks. In particular, although individuals with MTS showed no difficulty when 
required to adopt the perspective of another individual (enhance other, inhibit self), they 
found it more difficult when the requirement was to inhibit other and enhance self during 
the imitation-inhibition task.  Such findings provide further support for the main results 
reported here and shed light on the fractionability of processes underlying typical social 
cognition. In this context, it is worth noting that the choice of tasks for the present research 
was made on the basis that they allow distinguishing between the control requirements of 
self-other representations (enhancing self – inhibiting other vs. enhancing other – 
inhibiting self).  Another interesting line of inquiry for future research in MTS would be to 
investigate differences between MTS and non-synaesthetes in more implicit socio-
cognitive measures such as gaze following and shared attentional processing.  
Of relevance to the present results is a previous neuroimaging study (Holle Banissy 
and Ward, 2013) showing that, compared to controls, individuals with MTS showed 
reduced grey matter volume in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsal 
regions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). There is accumulating evidence of these 
regions’ involvement in the control of self-other representations (e.g. Brass et al., 2009; 
Lombardo et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Spengler et al., 2010; van Overwalle, 
2009). For example, Santiesteban et al., (2012) found that excitatory stimulation of TPJ 
showed enhanced ability to distinguish between self and other during the imitation 
inhibition and visual perspective taking tasks.  Taken together, the findings of Holle et al 
(2013) and the current data support the view that atypical self-other processing could 
underlie the synaesthetic experience of those with MTS (Banissy and Ward, 2013). 
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Our results may explain previous reports of enhanced emotion recognition in MTS 
(e.g. Banissy et al., 2011) if one assumes that recognition of another’s state is typically 
impaired by competing self representations – as evidenced by mood effects on emotion 
recognition (e.g. Schmid and Mast, 2010)  – but that a failure to inhibit other representations 
in MTS means that representation of the other’s emotion is less impaired by representation 
of one’s own emotion. 
In a broader context, the findings are also interesting in relation to debates 
regarding the extent to which overt mirror-sensory experiences (as seen in MTS) constitute 
an instance of synaesthesia (Rothen & Meier, 2013; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012). While a 
variety of features appear to be shared between traditional forms of synaesthesia (e.g. 
grapheme-colour synaesthesia, lexical-gustatory synaesthesia – see Ward, 2013 for review) 
and mirror-sensory experiences, it has been argued that overt mirror-sensory experiences 
do not constitute a form of synaesthesia because a) the experiences are limited to a single 
synaesthetic inducer (i.e. the stimulus that evokes synaesthesia) and b) the concurrent 
experiences (i.e. the experience that is evoked by the inducer) in conditions like MTS 
appear more systematic than idiosyncratic (Rothen & Meier, 2013).  We have also 
previously suggested that the neurocognitive mechanisms that are likely to contribute to 
MTS and more traditional forms of synaesthesia are likely to be different (Banissy et al., 
2009; Ward & Banissy, In Press), with MTS acting more upon atypical activation of 
mechanisms that govern normal multisensory interactions (i.e. MTS may lie on a 
continuum seen in typical adults, whereas traditional forms of synaesthesia may not).  Our 
finding that individuals with MTS show broad difficulties inhibiting representation of 
another’s action in the absence of any concurrent experience add to this debate by 
suggesting that, unlike traditional forms of synaesthesia, MTS may be a product of atypical 
  15 
functioning of mechanisms that govern interactions between self-other processing and 
vicarious representations that are present in us all.  In this regard, one may consider MTS 
as an instance of atypical self-other processing that is characterised by visually induced 
tactile sensations, rather than a traditional form of synaesthesia per se.   
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Mirror-touch synaesthetes (MTS, black bars) show selective impairment in imitation 
inhibition (A and B), but not in visual perspective taking and theory of mind (C and D) compared 
to a matched control group (grey bars). Error bars represent S.E.M.  **p < .01; * p <.05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
